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Imposing a Duty in an Online World: 






In light of fettle attempts by state legislatures to subdue the 
growing cyberbullying epidemic, the time has come to create a civil 
duty upon those who can control the problem—web hosts and 
webservers.  While the general “foreseeable plaintiff” duty set forth 
by then-Chief Judge Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.1 
has controlled the duty of care owed to the person of another for the 
last century, Judge Andrews’ dissent may hold the key to unlock this 
new societal problem: “Every one owes to the world at large the duty 
of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the 
safety of others.  . . . Not only is he wronged to whom harm, might 
reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, 
even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger 
zone.”2
This article explores the depths of the current liability imposed 
upon web hosts and webservers, while advancing that the general tort 
duty owed to third parties needs to be expanded to include the 
  By imposing a duty to prevent harm upon web hosts and 
webservers where cyberbullying harm continues to occur—mainly 
Facebook—the law is able to adapt to the new source of harm to 
address the growing, unsolved problem. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School.  Emory University
(B.A., magna cum laude, 1992); Washington University School of Law (J.D., 1995).   The
author would like to thank Thomas O. Rainey, IV and Noel Le for their assistance with 
this article.  This article is dedicated to Michael S. Fineman.
1. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
2. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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aforementioned group.  By expanding a duty to prevent cyberbullying 
harm upon those who can act—those who have the constitutional 
ability to control speech—web hosts and webservers are best 
positioned to cure the surmounting issue of online abuse upon the 
person of another.  At the end, by proactively monitoring, and when 
necessary, chilling the private speech of those who inflict the greatest 
blows, online hosts such as Facebook not only have the moral duty, 
but upon the creation of a legal duty, the obligation to address the 
cyberbullying problem.  Thus, the cyberbullying issue may be 
resolved by revisiting Andrews’ dissenting view that everyone owes a 
duty to the person of another to prevent harm from a third person, 
including Facebook. 
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I. Introduction
In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad. Co.,3 Justice Cardozo set 
forth the general rule that a defendant only owes a duty to 
foreseeable plaintiffs.4  While Cardozo’s “foreseeable plaintiff” rule 
has become the standard, Justice Andrews’ dissent in Palsgraf 
articulated a contrasting standard to measure civil duties, noting that 
“[e]very one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from 
those acts which unreasonably threaten the safety of others.” 5
3. Id.
  
Currently, web hosts are immune from liability for cyberbullying, yet 
the they provide the medium through which the cyberbully attacks.  
While the thrust of this article does not advocate overturning the long 
established principles set forth by Justice Cardozo, perhaps the time 
4. Id. at 101.
5. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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has come to reconsider Andrews’ dissent and extend liability to the 
web host themselves. 
It is a well-settled principle in tort law that a defendant does not 
have a duty to control the conduct of a third person, such as to 
prevent the third person from engaging in conduct that results in 
harm to a would-be plaintiff.6  Over time, however, the courts have 
carved out various exceptions to this general rule, focusing on the 
special relationship between the parties and the control the third 
party exercises over instruments capable of inflicting harm. 7
Part I of this article will demonstrate how shifting the cost for 
online tort liability between web hosts, third parties, and victims of 
injurious content can deter harmful Internet activity.  Part II will 
show that curbing some kinds of online speech does not impede the 
Internet’s potential as a communications medium because not all 
speech contributes to the “marketplace of ideas.”  Part III will survey 
factors that determine and allocate the cost of injurious online 
speech, including personal jurisdiction, statutory web host immunity, 
and preliminary injunction for online defamation.  Part IV will 
demonstrate how courts can consider the particular characteristics of 
Internet speech while applying the traditional tort of public disclosure 
of private facts, as well as the refusal of courts to recognize a form of 
negligence online.  Finally, Part V concludes with recommendations 
  In 
addition, the formula for imputing civil liability to prevent harm to 
the person of another has developed by comparing control with the 
foreseeability of harm resulting.  Of these exceptions to the general 
rule, for the purposes of this discussion, this article focuses on duties 
that arise between: the special relationship between the primary 
defendant and the third party defendant, the context of a defendant 
that permits a third party to use his personal property, and the 
relationships where the defendant becomes aware that a third person 
intends to harm the victim. 
6. E.g., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 53 (W. Page Keeton et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1984) (“But it should be recognized that ‘duty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but is 
only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to 
say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.”). 
7. “The rule that you are to love your neighbor becomes in law, you must not injure
your neighbor; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbor? receives a restricted reply.  
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbor.  Who, then, in law is my neighbor?  The 
answer seems to be—persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I 
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing 
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in questions.”  Id. (quoting Donoghue v. 
Stevenson, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883)). 
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on how to make the cost of online tort claims more equitable between 
third parties, victims, and web hosts. 
II. Web host Liability:
The Law and Economics of Online Tort Claims 
Over the last decade, the Internet has become a new frontier, 
replacing traditional notions of means of communicating, sharing 
information, and fostering relationships.8  Despite the advancements 
the modern digital world has had on society as a whole, unfettered 
and unrestricted access produces not only healthy, but injurious 
exchanges.9  The ability to communicate digitally and anonymously 
has fostered an online-world where accountability for one’s 
comments and statements has disappeared. 10   Specifically, the 
cyberbully epidemic has not only consumed the news media11 and 
political agendas,12 but legal scholars have also joined in the debate.13
Similar to public parks, street corners, and courthouse steps, the 
protections afforded by the First Amendment limit the extent of 
government regulation of online speech.
  
Yet the question remains as to who should bear the duty to prevent 
and control cyberbullying. 
14
8. Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? A
Public Lecture and Symposium on Michael J. Sandel’s Recent Book, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 
1444 (2011) (advancing “[o]nline activity can facilitate civic engagement and political 
participation”). 
  But private web hosts are 
free to limit the manner, mode, and method of online speech.  Web 
9. Id. at 1438.
10. Id. at 1447–48.
11. E.g., Gracie Bonds Staples, Cobb middle school student files suit alleging
cyberbullying, ATLANTA J. CONST., (Apr. 27, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://www.ajc.com/news/ 
news/local/cobb-middle-school-student-files-suit-alleging-cyb/nQTMb/; Anderson Cooper, 
Video: Holding Teen Bullies Accountable, CNN, (Sept. 28, 2011, 3:00 PM), 
http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/28/video-holding-teen-bullies-accountable/. 
12. See generally NAT’L CON. OF STATE LEG., Cyberbullying, Cyberbullying Enacted
Legislation: 2006-2010, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/cyberbullying.aspx (listing 
cyberbullying legislation enacted by the individual states). 
13. E.g., Joe Dryden, It’s a Matter of Life and Death: Judicial Support for School
Authority Over Off-Campus Student Cyber Bullying and Harassment, 33 U. LA VERNE L. 
REV. 171 (2012); Jamie Wolf, Note, The Playground Bully has Gone Digital: The Dangers 
of Cyberbullying, the First Amendment Implications, and the Necessary Responses, 10 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 575, 576 (2012). 
14. William H. Freivogel, Does the Communications Decency Act Foster Indecency?,
16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 17, 39 (2011). 
   
2013] IMPOSING A DUTY IN AN ONLINE WORLD 281 
services providers like Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! have the 
ability to leverage content created by third parties.  For example, a 
private Internet service provider can pre-screen speech or remove 
speech from the web—actions which would not pass muster if 
engaged in by any state actor.  As such, a tradeoff of the private 
business of providing Internet service enables these private actors to 
address harmful content as a cost of doing business.  But absent an 
incentive—or a duty—to act, these private individuals are free to 
make discretionary judgments regarding what speech they will allow 
and what speech they will chill. 
III. The Nature of Online Speech
Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized that “the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes 
safely can be carried out . . . It is an experiment, as all life is an 
experiment.”15  This test has become known as the marketplace of 
ideas theory. 16   But in the context of cyberbullying, should the 
marketplace control the truth?  One method for controlling behavior 
is to raise the cost associated with pursuing the activity associated 
with the behavior.17  As such, recent judicial activity suggests courts 
are able to influence the demand for wrongful online activity by 
raising the cost for third parties and by encouraging web hosts and 
web servers to take—or forgo—certain actions.18 
A. Personal Jurisdiction
As with any civil action, personal jurisdiction is the threshold 
issue, and as applied to online tort claims, a critical issue arises 
because of the multi-jurisdictional nature of online speech.19
15. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
  Due to 
personal jurisdiction functioning as a gatekeeper in civil litigation, 
reform of personal jurisdiction issues may deter the creation of 
16. Id.
17. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 140, 278 (Vicki Been et al.
eds., 8th ed. 2011). 
18. See Discussion infra. [this FN should refer to a specific section, even if it’s this
section –MT] 
19. E.g., Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus
Punishment, 85 IND.. L.J. 1113 (2010). 
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wrongful online content.  While outside the scope of this discussion, 
the personal jurisdiction bearer is an important issue because defining 
the means of how an aggrieved party is able to seek redress helps to 
define the actions that are necessary of third parties (like web hosts) 
to prevent harm. 
B. Webhost Liability Under the Communication Decency Act
The Communication Decency Act (“CDA”) provides immunity 
from liability for providers and users of online services who publish 
information provided by others. 20   According to Professor Mark 
Lemley, tort immunity for web hosts exists only in the early judicial 
interpretation of section 230(c) of the CDA. 21   In fact, Lemley 
discovered that courts apply no other statute as a shield of absolute 
immunity for web hosts and webservers.22
Moreover, no other statute has been interpreted by courts to 
confer absolute immunity for web hosts.
 
23
20. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
  After its inception, courts 
interpreting the CDA’s safe harbor granted web sites absolute 
immunity, harboring them from liability even after receiving notice of 
21. Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 101, 112 (2007).  See also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006): 
(c) Protection for “good samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive
material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of--
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected;
or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).
22. Lemley, supra note 21, at 112.
23. Id.
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wrongful content if they failed or refused to remove the content at 
issue.24  One research article stated: 
Congress recognized that websites could not feasibly 
monitor the accuracy of the huge volume of information 
that their users may choose to post.  If the law permitted 
an angry plaintiff to hold a website liable for information 
that the website did not create, such liability would stifle 
free speech as fewer and fewer sites would be willing to 
permit users to post anything at all.  Xcentric Ventures, 
LLC, which operates the website Ripoff Report, one of 
the websites most frequently sued for defamation, has 
successfully defended more than twenty lawsuits because 
of the safe harbor provisions in the CDA.25 
Judicial interpretation of the safe harbor provision after passage 
of the Act is relatively broad compared to the Congressional intent in 
drafting the safe harbor provision. 26   According to Lemley, by 
rendering section 230 of the CDA as providing web hosts absolute 
immunity, web hosts were left with no incentive to exercise control 
over third party content.27  As such, the effect of granting web hosts 
absolute immunity under the CDA distorts the economic incentives 
Congress meant to confer to web hosts—as opposed to encouraging 
web hosts to enforce terms of use, absolute immunity induces web 
hosts to turn a blind eye to obvious and foreseeable harms.28
In theory, section 230 of the CDA
 
29
24. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Ben Ezra, Weinstein
& Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 
465 (3d Cir. 2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 serves an economizing 
function by immunizing web hosts from liability for content created 
25. Kraig J. Marton et al., Protecting One’s Reputation—How To Clear A Name In A
World Where Name Calling Is So Easy, 4 PHOENIX L. REV 53, 63 (2010). 
26. Lemley, supra note 21, at 112.
27. Id. at 112–13.
28. Id. at 113.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (West 2006). Protection for “good samaritan” blocking and
screening of offensive material: 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of--
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by third parties. 30   But without such immunity, web hosts face 
prohibitive costs in maintaining online services open to millions of 
Internet users.31  Despite this, lawmakers and courts were not always 
clear on how to provide web hosts with the incentive to operate on 
the mainstream Internet, while simultaneously addressing any 
harmful content created by third parties.32  As case law interpreting 
section 230 of the CDA developed, courts learned that granting 
absolute immunity may have the very opposite effect of giving web 
hosts the incentive to police their sites that Congress had hoped for in 
passing the CDA.33  While the theoretical role of web host immunity 
is straightforward, the extent of optimal immunity was not.34
In a perfect world, the right level of immunity serves the interest 
of web hosts, third parties and potential victims concurrently.
 
35  One 
possible means to strike a balance between all parties, and serve 
greater public good, is through qualified immunity.36
Prior to the CDA, the New York Supreme Court decided in 
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services that a web service could be held 
liable when it failed to take down content created by a third party 
because the web service monitored content from third parties and 
claimed it would delete content that violated its terms of service.
 
37  
Congress enacted the CDA in 1996 in part to overturn the Stratton 
opinion.38
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected;
or
 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).
30. See Freivogel, supra note 14, at 45.
31. Id.
32. See 141 CONG. REC. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement by Rep. Cox)
(without absolute immunity web hosts would discard terms of service to avoid liability 
altogether, thereby allowing third parties to publishing anything on their web sites).  See 
also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 
668 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding limited immunity, rather than absolute immunity, will induce 
web hosts to be accountable for harmful content created by third parties). 
33. Lemley, supra note 21, at 113.
34. Id. at 102 (describing safe harbors that grant absolute and partial immunity).
35. See id. at 101–02.
36. Id. at 113.
37. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Corp, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 25, 1995). 
38. 141 Cong. Rec. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement by Rep. Cox).
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The Stratton decision provided part of the impetus for 
Section 230; Congress worried that the decision would 
discourage online computer services from removing 
obscene content from their sites because they would 
conclude that the only way to avoid publisher liability was 
to eschew responsibility and allow everything to be 
posted.  So Stratton threatened both to open the door to 
indecency and to interfere with the robustness of the fast 
developing Internet.39 
In one of the first interpretations of the CDA safe harbor in 1997, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted 
the CDA in Zeran v. America Online as giving the webhost absolute 
immunity: Section 230 “creates a federal immunity to any cause of 
action that would make service providers liable for information 
originating with a third-party user of the service.”40  The Zeran court 
rationalized this conclusion in economic terms, holding “it would be 
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of 
postings for possible problems.”41
For a decade following Zeran, federal courts followed suit in 
applying CDA section 230 as conferring absolute immunity for web 
hosts for content created by third parties.
   
42  In 2002, Congress issued 
the Committee Report to the Dot Kids Implementation and 
Efficiency Act, in which it approved of the Zeran line of cases.43
Professor Mark Lemley asserts that the absolute immunity under 




ISPs have no incentive to police their sites even for 
content that obviously does not belong there, or to take 
down even material that is clearly false or injurious. Nor 
are they even obligated to aid the plaintiff in finding the 
wrongdoer by disclosing the identity of their clients.  As a 
39. Freivogel, supra note 14 at 21–22.
40. Zeran , 129 F.3d at 330.
41. Id. at 331.
42. See Universal Commc’n. Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007); Almeida
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d 980.
43. H.R. REP. No. 107-449 at 13 (2002) (stating “courts have correctly interpreted
section 230(c)”). 
44. Lemley,  supra note 21 at 113–14.
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result, absolute immunity may lead to plaintiffs being 
unable to remove objectionable material or to find the 
tortfeasor in order to recover damages from her, and 
therefore remaining uncompensated even for egregious 
harms.45 
Zeran protected the web host from traditional secondary liability, 
and appeared to create an Internet specific form of tort immunity that 
did not exist outside the Internet.46  Even before the Zeran decision in 
1997, Judge Frank Easterbrook expressed doubts on such an 
approach to online liability. 
Judge Easterbrook’s skepticism about the Zeran approach 
may have been foreshadowed in a talk in 1996 at the 
University of Chicago.  Judge Easterbrook taught there 
earlier in his career and was a prominent advocate of a 
law and economics school of thought that favors legal 
solutions consistent with free market realities.  In his 1996 
talk, Judge Easterbrook recalled that a former dean of the 
University of Chicago Law School, Gerhard Casper, had 
once remarked that the school didn’t have a course on 
“The Law of the Horse.” By this, Casper meant that a lot 
of cases deal with horses—people kicked by horses, 
licensing race horses, veterinarian care of horses, prizes at 
horse shows—but it would be absurd to teach a course on 
the law of the horse. The same is true for cyberspace, 
Judge Easterbrook said. It would be better for judges to 
develop a sound set of laws for intellectual property and 
then apply them to cyberspace, he said.47 
In recent years, courts departed from the early line of CDA 
section 230 cases granting web hosts absolute immunity.48  In Jones v. 
Dirty World Entertainment, one federal district court determined that 
web host immunity is not absolute.49
45. Id. at 113.
  Web hosts fall outside the reach 
of the CDA’s safe harbor when they no longer act as passive hosts by 
46. E.g., Joseph Monaghan, Social Networking Websites’ Liability For User Illegality,
21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 499, 505 (2011). 
47. Freivogel, supra note 14, at 25.
48. See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t, 840 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1011 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
49. Id. at 1009.
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encouraging and soliciting wrongful content from third parties or 
creating such content.50  In Jones, Sarah Jones, a Cincinnati Bengals 
cheerleader and part time teacher, sued the operator of thedirty.com 
for state law claims of defamation and invasion of privacy for content 
posted by a third party that she argued the site encouraged and 
therefore rendered itself in part liable.51  Owners of thedirty.com, 
Dirty World Entertainment, filed a motion for judgment as a matter 
of law for absolute immunity under the CDA.52  The Federal District 
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed the motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.53  The court ruled that CDA section 230 
immunity is not absolute, and only applies when the webhost is not 
“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of” 
the offending content.54
In departing from the Zeran line of cases, the Federal District 
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky cited persuasive authority 
from the Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals in finding Dirty 
World outside the reach of the CDA’s safe harbor for web hosts.
 
55  
Relying on Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com,56 and Federal Trade Commission v. Accusearch,57 
the Jones court determined that a web host is not immune from tort 
liability under the CDA if the host takes action beyond that of a 
passive service provider.58  The web host can become responsible for 
offensive content by specifically encouraging or soliciting wrongful 
content.59  Immunity for web hosts under the CDA, however, is not 
absolute. 60   Applying the principles from the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits, the court found that Dirty World “specifically encourag[ed]” 
development of the wrongful content.61
50. Id.
  The facts cited by the court in 
finding Dirty World as a non-passive web host that encouraged or 
helped develop wrongful content include the site’s name, the editor’s 
51. Id.
52. See Jane Doe v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 2010 WL 4018629 (E.D.
Ky. 2010). 
53. Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1009.
54. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2006).
55. Jones, F.Supp.2d at 1011.
56. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157
(9th Cir. 2008). 
57. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
58. Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1011.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1012.
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discretion in removing content after notification from the plaintiff, 
the editor’s own comments on postings made by third parties, and the 
editor’s interactions with third parties regarding the wrongful 
content.62
A law and economics perspective of the District Court’s denial of 
Dirty World’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under the CDA 
considers the opinion’s effect on webhost’s conduct.  The CDA’s 
qualified safe harbor, as interpreted in Jones, serves an economizing 
function.  Victims of tortious online content face steep costs in 
pursuing private settlement.
 
63  Perpetrators are often anonymous and 
unwilling parties.64  When costs are prohibitive in the market, the next 
recourse is litigation.65  In litigation, the ability of victims to claim 
against web hosts increases their chances to collect court judgments, 
while pursuing private third parties could only render awards dwarfed 
by the cost of litigation. 66  In online tort suits, the plaintiff has 
incentives to pursue big-pocketed web sites rather than unwilling, 
individual parties who may not be able to fulfill judgment awards.67  
Providing web hosts absolute immunity under the CDA is not socially 
optimal when those web entities have a financial incentive to host 
wrongful content, yet are immune regardless of their conduct.68
The CDA’s safe harbor provision is the functional equivalent of a 
subsidy to web hosts from Internet users, decreasing the costs for web 
hosts to publish without need for pre-publication verification of 
content for accuracy and other legal compliance.
 
69   The subsidy 
quickens online publishing, allowing web hosts to take advantage of 
instantaneous Internet communications.  In legal terms, the CDA’s 
limited safe harbor is simply an issue of proximate cause. 70
62. Id.
  In 
economic terms, removing safe harbor protection is a way for courts 
to cancel the subsidy that injured Internet users pay to web hosts and 
63. See Who Pays for Tort Liability Claims?, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISORS (Apr, 2002), available at http://www.policyalmanac.org 
/economic/archive/ torts.shtml (last visited August 20, 2012). 
64. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield For Scoundrels: An Empirical Study
Of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 Of The Communications Decency Act, 43 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 486 (2010). 
65. POSNER, supra note 17, at 935.
66. See Ardia, supra note 64, at 486.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 936
70. See id.
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make web hosts internalize the externalities of their actions.71  In 
essence, courts are saying to web hosts—don’t look a gift horse in the 
mouth.  Publishers who allow or incite others to produce harmful 
content create externalities that provide an economic argument for 
speech regulation. 72   Providing private parties actionable claims 
against web hosts for publishing harmful content about them reduces 
the demand, and hence the incentives, for the publishing of such 
content.73  Contributory liability for web hosts from content authored 
by private parties may reduce the cost of online tort enforcement.74  
As such, to not allow private parties to make tort claims against web 
hosts equates to making Internet use an assumption of risk, which 
would deter Internet use and render the Internet’s communications 
capabilities less valuable.75
The Jones court’s reliance on persuasive authority from other 
circuits is salient.  Even though tort claims for invasion of privacy, 
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress reside in 
state law, interpretation of the CDA is a matter of federal law, 
rendering precedent in one circuit susceptible to serve as persuasive 
authority in other federal circuits.
 
76  In the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal, facts that determined the outcome of 
the CDA safe harbor analysis may render interactive sites liable 
under section 230 qualified immunity.77  But in the Third and Fourth 
Circuits, web hosts may still enjoy absolute immunity.78 
C. Judicial Trend Away From Absolute Immunity
The basis for the gradual trend away from reading CDA section 
230 as providing web hosts with absolute immunity finds its roots in 
the realization of economic incentives resulting from such an 
71. See id.
72. Id. at 937.
73. Id. at 936.
74. See id.
75. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 670 (stating “to appreciate the limited role of § 230,
remember that ‘information content providers’ may be liable for contributory 
infringement if their system is designed to help people steal music or other material in 
copyright”) 
76. See Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1011.
77. E.g., Smith, 333 F.3d 1018; Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157; Accusearch, 570 F.3d
1187; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d 980.  In contrast, the Seventh Circuit may not extend absolute 
immunity under CDA § 230.  See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at669. 
78. See Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d at 327; Green, 318 F.3d at 465.
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interpretation of the CDA.79  In Doe v. GTE Corp., Judge Frank 
Easterbrook recognized that absolute immunity induces web hosts 
“to take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity” under the 
CDA.80  Judge Easterbrook noted that the incentives provided by 
absolute immunity conflict with the basis of the CDA: “[T]he 
‘Communications Decency Act’ bears the title ‘Protection for “Good 
Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material,’ hardly an 
apt description if its principal effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing 
about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their 
services.”81
Along these same lines, in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee For Civil 
Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Judge Easterbrook reiterated that the 
CDA “as a whole cannot be understood as a general prohibition of 
civil liability for web-site operators and other online content hosts.”
 
82  
Easterbrook suggested that a web host “causing a particular 
statement to be made” or causing the injurious “content of a 
statement” might render that web host susceptible to liability.83  In 
causing particular statements or the injurious content of statements, 
web hosts become vulnerable to liability. 84   Legal commentators 
praised Easterbrook’s approach to the CDA: 
Judge Easterbrook’s interpretation of Section 230 
persuasively demonstrates that Zeran has interpreted the 
law in a way that provides computer services little 
incentive to monitor their sites for offensive content.  As a 
result, Judge Easterbrook is correct in arguing that in this 
way the Zeran interpretation is contrary to the title and 
purpose of the law.85 
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fair Housing 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com interpreted CDA 
section 230 with the background of the Seventh Circuit’s dicta in 
GTE and Craigslist “in mind.” 86
79. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir 2003).
  Roommates.com concerned an 
online roommate-matching website that allowed visitors to choose 
80. Id. at 660.
81. Id.
82. Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669.
83. Id. at 671–72.
84. Id. at 670.
85. Freivogel, supra note 14, at 28.
86. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164.
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from drop down menus criteria for roommates, which may violate the 
federal Fair Housing Act. 87   Applying the Craigslist analysis of 
causation and distinction between direct and third party content 
providers, the Roommates.com court determined that the defendant 
“created” discriminatory questions and choice of answers, and 
“designed” its website registration around them.88  Roommates.com’s 
actions in causing the injurious content rendered it an “information 
content provider.”89  The Roommates.com court found that section 
230 “provides immunity only if the interactive computer service does 
not “creat[e] or develop[ ] the information “in whole or in part.”90 
The nexus between “causation” and the designation of 
roommates.com rendering itself an “information content provider” 
was salient.91  The Craigslist court stated: “The critical question is 
whether Roommates.com is itself an “information content provider,” 
such that it cannot claim that the information at issue was “provided 
by another information content provider.”  In other words, the court 
decided that roommates.com fell out of reach of the section 230 
immunity by no longer acting as a passive content publisher and 
becoming a content provider itself rather than relaying information 
from third party information content providers.92  According to the 
Court, this interpretation of the CDA comported with the initial 
economic basis of the CDA rather than early judicial interpretation of 
the statute: 
In passing section 230, Congress sought to spare 
interactive computer services . . . to perform some editing 
on user-generated content without thereby becoming 
liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages 
that they didn’t edit or delete.  In other words, “Congress 
sought to immunize the removal of user-generated 
content, not the creation of content.”93 
This reading of the CDA is contrary to that in Zeran, which found 
that the CDA immunized web hosts from any kind of liability from 
87. Id. at 1162.
88. Id. at 1164.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1166 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).
91. Id. at 1181–82.
92. Id. at 1166.
93. Id. at 1163 (emphasis in original).
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third party content by not distinguishing between content creation 
and content removal.94
In Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the 
Court’s decision in Roommates.com, adopting both the causation and 
“content provider” aspects of the Roommates.com decision.
 
95 
Accusearch concerned a web host who collected and sold confidential 
information to third parties, including private phone records, the 
acquisition of which could violate the Telecommunications Act or 
circumvent it by fraud or theft. 96   Applying the holding from 
Roommates.com, the Accusearch court determined that the web host 
“solicited” requests for confidential information protected by law and 
“knew” the information would be obtained through “fraud or 
illegality.”97  Further, the court determined that offensive postings 
resulting from the wrongful collection of confidential information was 
Accusearch’s raison d’etre.98  The Accusearch decision incorporated 
the Court’s analysis from Roommates.com by focusing on the 
causation inquiry.  The Accusearch court stated the immunity for the 
defendant hinged on whether the web host was “responsible for the 
development of the specific content that was the source of the alleged 
liability.”99  If the web host defendant was responsible as the cause for 
the injurious content, the web host becomes an information content 
provider in his own right: “an information content provider of certain 
content is not immune from liability arising from publication of that 
content.”100
Limitations to web host immunity under the CDA may arise 
through creative legal arguments.
 
101  In Barnes v. Yahoo!, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed negligent undertaking and 
promissory estoppel claims in a case where an ex-boyfriend created a 
fake Yahoo! profile of the victim, Barnes.102  The profile included 
intimate photos, private information and a fake solicitation for sex.103
94. Id. at 1164.
  
After several failed attempts to contact Yahoo! by mail to take down 
the profile, a Director of Communications for Yahoo! contacted 
95. Accusearch, 570 F.3d at1197.
96. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1157; see also Accusearch, 570 F.3d at1191–92.
97. Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199.
98. Id. at 1200.
99. Id. at 1198.
100. Id. at 1187.
101. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
102. Id. at 1098.
103. Id.
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Barnes and asked the victim to fax Yahoo! a copy of the letters.  In 
reponse, the Yahoo! director told the victim she would “personally 
walk the statements over to the division responsible for stopping 
unauthorized profiles and they would take care of it.”104  The victim 
relied on these statements and took no further action to remove the 
profiles.105  Notwithstanding this representation by the director at 
Yahoo!, the profile remained in place for two months until the 
initiation of the suit against Yahoo!.106
In Barnes, the court rejected the victim’s argument on the 
negligent undertaking claim by noting that receiving notice of the 
injurious content and by initiating steps to remove that content, 
Yahoo! acted “not as a publisher, but rather as one who undertook to 
perform a service and did it negligently.”
 
107  Under this theory, 
Yahoo! would be liable not for publishing or failing to take down the 
content, but for initiating but withdrawing from its undertaking to 
remove the content.108  As Yahoo! would not be held liable as a 
publisher, the CDA’s section 230 safe harbor would not protect the 
web host.109  The court squarely rejected this theory noting: 
We are not persuaded. As we implied above, a plaintiff 
cannot sue someone for publishing third-party content 
simply by changing the name of the theory from 
defamation to negligence. Nor can he or she escape 
section 230(c) by labeling as a “negligent undertaking” an 
action that is quintessentially that of a publisher.  The 
word “undertaking,” after all, is meaningless without the 
following verb.  That is, one does not merely undertake; 
one undertakes to do something.  And what is the 
undertaking that Barnes alleges Yahoo failed to perform 
with due care?  The removal of the indecent profiles that 
her former boyfriend posted on Yahoo’s website.  But 
removing content is something publishers do, and to 
impose liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily 
involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the 
content it failed to remove.110




107. Id. at 1102.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1102–03.
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While the Barnes court rejected the negligent undertaking claim 
as merely rephrasing arguments under different legal doctrines, it 
distinguished the promissory claim as standing on sufficiently 
independent grounds: “liability for breach of promise is different 
from, and not merely a rephrasing of, liability for negligent 
undertaking.”111
On the promissory estoppel claim, the victim referred to Yahoo!’s 
“promise” to address the situation and the fact that this promise 
caused “reliance” that created “detriment.”
 
112  The court construed 
the victim’s language as alleging a cause of action for promissory 
estoppel under section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts.113  The Court determined that the victim, through her 
promissory estoppel claim, sought to hold Yahoo! liable as a promisor 
who breached contract rather than as a publisher of third party 
content.114  The court defined the promisor obligation of Yahoo! as 
arising when Yahoo! made a promise it intended, actually or 
constructively, to induce reliance by Barnes that the fake profile 
created by her ex-boyfriend would be taken down.115
The promissory estoppel holding in Barnes by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals simply allowed the victim to survive a motion to 
dismiss by Yahoo!.
 
116  The court was careful to address why the 
promissory estoppel claim could survive while the negligent 
undertaking claim could not.  The court also limited its holding, 
stating that it “cannot simply infer a promise” to take down content.117  
Such promises must “be as clear and well defined.”118  Hence, a 
“general monitoring policy, or even an attempt to help a particular 
person, on the part of an interactive computer service such as Yahoo! 
does not suffice for contract liability.”119  Therefore, a web host 
making general statements about take downs in a terms of service 
provision may not necessarily be making a promise sufficient for a 
claim of promissory estoppel.120
111. Id. at 1106.
  Further, web hosts like Yahoo! can 
112. Id. at 1099.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1107.
115. Id. at 1107–08.
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simply disclaim their intention not to be bound in terms of service 
provisions on take downs and avoid a promissory estoppel claim.121
The trend away from absolute immunity for web hosts under 
section 230 of the CDA originated in the 2003 Seventh Circuit’s dicta 
in GTE.
 
122  This trend continued in other circuits.  Specifically, in 
2008, the Seventh Circuit reiterated dicta in Craigslist,123 that was later 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals holding in 
Roommates.com,124 which was readopted in the 2009 holding by the 
Tenth Circuit in Accusearch.125  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
decisions in GTE and Craigslist formulated rules qualifying immunity 
under CDA section 230, however, the facts in those cases did not 
render the defendant web hosts liable even without absolute 
immunity.126  Yet, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of CDA section 
230 as providing only qualified immunity became part of the essential 
holdings in Roommates.com and Accusearch due to the facts in those 
cases. 127   Had facts similar to those in Roommates.com and 
Accusearch been present before the Seventh Circuit in GTE and 
Craigslist, those cases may well have turned out differently, with 
liability against the web hosts.128  In view of this history of a chain 
reaction among the federal circuits of interpreting only qualified 
immunity for web hosts under the CDA, the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Barnes suggests that web hosts may begin to face liability as these 
cases permeate through the courts.129
Despite court decisions supporting the rights of victims, the broad 
sweep of qualified immunity for web hosts under the CDA suggests 
that courts have interpreted the statute to supersede traditional 
secondary liability analysis under proximate cause.
 
130   Under the 
traditional analysis, entities can incur liability for “knowledge of, 
promotion of, refraining to control, or profiting from illegal 
activity.”131
121. Id.
  Interestingly, the profiting of web activity for monetary 
 122. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660.
 123. Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669.
 124. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at  1164.
125. Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1198.
126. Compare GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660; with Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669.
127. See, e.g., id.
128. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660; Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669; Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 
at 1164; Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1198. 
129. See Barnes, 570 F.3d 1096.
130. Monaghan, supra note 46, at 506.
131. Id.
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gain may invoke personal jurisdiction for a web host in a foreign 
forum yet not allow victims to claim tort actions against the web host. 
The court in Jones wrote: 
The facts alleged here indicate that Dirty World, LLC, 
through thedirty.com, intentionally reaches beyond the 
boundaries of its home state to conduct business and 
interact with residents of other states. It is a fair 
assumption that the defendants are not in this business as 
a hobby, but rather to make money, as do most web sites, 
by advertising. The defendants publish invidious and 
salacious posts by visitors to the web site (known on the 
site as “THE DIRTY ARMY”), they respond to those 
posts with their own comments, and they thereby 
encourage and generate further posts by readers. In effect, 
a dialogue is created. It is also a fair inference that the 
salacious posts will invite hits from residents of the region 
where the subject of the posts lives and/or works.132 
Interpretations of the CDA, even decisions taking contrary views 
on absolute and qualified immunity, protect web hosts from 
traditional secondary liability.133  Under secondary liability analysis, 
web hosts would be liable if they served as the proximate cause under 
common law tort analysis. 134   One commentator compared the 
language of the CDA and found it consistent with court decisions 
finding secondary liability in non-Internet cases and Internet cases 
involving intellectual property (which is statutorily exempt under 
CDA section 230(c)’s safe harbor provision).135
132. Jones, 766 F.Supp.2d 828, 833 (E.D. Ky. 2011)
 
133. Monaghan, supra note 46 at 507.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 533 n.46. Compare § 230(c)(2) (“No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held [civilly] liable on account of ... (A) any action voluntarily 
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”); with Fonovisa, 
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding operators of a swap 
meet liable where they allowed vendors to sell counterfeit goods and they had knowledge 
of, control of, and profited from the infringing activity); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 938, 941 (2005) (holding plaintiffs liable because they knew their 
software was used for copyright infringement, they promoted its use for copyright 
infringement, did not attempt to prevent the infringement, and profited from their users’ 
copyright infringement). 
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Web hosts are immune to tort liability when they simply refuse to 
remove online content even after notification from victims.136  Even 
after notification of injurious content, immunity enables web hosts to 
ignore patently unlawful speech with impunity. 137   As such, this 
immunity for web hosts under the CDA contrasts with the take down 
rules of the DMCA, which sets out takedown procedures for web 
hosts following notice of content that infringes a copyright.138  The 
CDA does not preempt the DMCA, but preempts tort laws such as 
defamation and privacy.139  Further, web hosts do not incur liability 
after notification that injurious content violates their own privacy 
policies and terms of use.140  Social networking sites like Facebook 
and MySpace have various schemes that allow users to report 
injurious content.  But the effectiveness of these reporting schemes is 
questionable if the sites face no liability when they fail to take 
action.141 
IV. Online Tort Claims
The internet magnifies the importance of lowering costs for 
victims because the free nature of publication online enables injurious 
activity at little to no cost to the wrongdoer.142  Further complicating 
the problem is the fact that pursuing claims for online tort actions can 
be costly.  These costs not only affect an aggrieved party’s ability to 
file suit,143 but are also considered by web hosts when drafting user 
agreements.144
136. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103; Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478
F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007).
  Moreover, seeking recovery for an online tort can be a 
costly and time consuming process.  To add to this difficulty, as much 
as forty-one percent of Internet tort claims involve anonymous 
137. See id.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
139. See id.
140. See Terence J. Lau, Towards Zero Net Presence, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 237, 269 (2011). 
141. Monaghan, supra note 46 at 526–27.
142. Marton, supra note 25, at 60.
143. See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social
Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261 (2010) (arguing for the 
refinement of judicial common law as a beneficial way for online victims to seek redress). 
144. See genearlly Allyson W. Haynes, Virtual Blinds: Finding Online Privacy in
Offline Precedents, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 603 (2012) (proposing solutions for 
online privacy disputes by incorporating user agreements that benefit all parties). 
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content and users.145  As such, what is the best way to curb this going 
concern?  This part will explore the effectiveness of the claims of 
defamation, invasion of privacy based on a public disclosure of 
private facts, and refusing to remove injurious content after 
publication, as these claims have become a great concern in the 




The law of defamation treats the written word more harshly than 
the spoken word.  Based on the nature of libelous acts, as compared 
to slander, libel is a more deliberate activity—there is more time to 
contemplate what one memorializes on paper or online, as opposed 
to speaking the same harmful content.  Hence, in liability for libel, as 
set forth in Jones, there is less of a danger involved in deterring 
socially valuable communications than there is in imposing liability 
for slander.  By way of comparison, as discussed above, personal 
jurisdiction and CDA immunity for web hosts’ jurisprudence involves 
claims for defamation.  Despite the courts treating personal 
jurisdiction over Internet claims in a favorable light with regard to 
victims of online defamation, the viability of any defamation action 
expanded only after courts removed the absolute immunity for web 
hosts.  Currently, the CDA’s absolute immunity may be the highest 
obstacle to transferring defamation to the Internet environment.  This 
begs the question: Should any web host immunity exist? 
The relationship between defamation claims and the CDA 
illustrates a function of economic incentives.  Prior to the CDA, web 
hosts bore the cost of injurious third party content entirely because 
the potential for harm was endless.  With the passing of CDA section 
230, Congress—in theory—sought to remove this burden for web 
hosts, while intending to encourage the hosts to enforce online terms 
of use without fear of liability.147
145. Marton,  supra note 25, at 60; Ardia, supra note 64 at 487.
  This new burden threatened not 
only the potential growth of online services, but also the development 
of Internet technologies.  Shortly after codification, courts interpreted 
section 230 to grant absolute immunity to web hosts, thereby passing 
146. See generally Ardia, supra note 143 at  261.
147. See generally David Lukmire, Can Courts Tame the Communications Decency
Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 
373–85 (2010) (outlining the legislative history of the CDA). 
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the cost of injurious online content onto the victims.148
As such, absent regulation of web hosts under the CDA, there is 
no incentive to absorb the cost of policing online content or taking 
affirmative steps to prevent the harm from occurring in the first 
place.
  These early 
rulings imposed steep costs on victims who were required to locate 
the third parties who created content, while leaving the web hosts 
shielded from liability.  The effect of these initial rulings resulted in 
the victims becoming the subsidizers of both third parties engaged in 
defamatory acts and the web hosts that not only provided the medium 
for the harm to occur, but continued to publish the defamatory 
content. 
149
B. Invasion of Privacy – Public Disclosure of Private Facts
William Prosser outlines the four basic rights of privacy to 
include: intrusion; disclosure of private facts; false light; and 
appropriation of name or likeness.150
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 652D set forth the 
privacy tort for public disclosure of private facts: 
  Following Prosser’s lead, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted this basic outline for 
individual privacy rights.  At the inception of the Internet and online 
interactions, courts applied these four basic rights, construing online 
activity to mirror offline tortious conduct.  Over time, however, courts 
have either abridged or effectively discarded the privacy tort of public 
disclosure of private facts.  In fact, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has all but rendered this tort a nullity.  To that end, scholars 
cite the need to strengthen the tort for disclosure of private facts to 
meet news dangers to privacy posed by online content and 
interactions.  Yet, what is puzzling about this sequence of events is 
that the privacy tort for disclosure of private facts provides the very 
foundation for many civil and criminal statutes. 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the 
private life of another is subject to liability to the other for 
148. Lemley, supra note 21, at 112.
149. E.g., Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE L. 
REV. 41, 45 (1998) (stating that intentional and unintentional communication are widely 
available to “a vast number of people”). 
150. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
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invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind 
that: (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, 
and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.151 
In jurisdictions applying section 652D, courts separate the tort of 
public disclosure of private facts into four parts: (1) publicity given to 
a matter that; (2) concerns the private life of another; (3) the matter 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (4) is not of 
legitimate public concern.152
Under the Restatement (Second), “publicity” entails 
communicating a matter in such a way as to make it available to the 
public at large rather than merely a few individuals.
 
153  With regard to 
online content, information posted on a website is sufficient to meet 
the publicity requirements.  Moreover, a private fact concerns the 
private matter, as opposed to a public fact, of an individual, and does 
not entail information that is already known or easily ascertainable in 
the public marketplace.  Element three, “highly offensive,” is defined 
by the Restatement to refer to “customs of the time and place.”  
Here, personal facts—such as the identify of someone with whom a 
party has had sexual relations—may constitute highly offensive 
information.  Lastly, the Restatement requires the matter not be one 
in which the public has a “proper interest” in discovering. 
V. Duty Owed to Third Parties
In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,154 Chief Judge Cardozo set 
forth the element of duty as being a relational concept by explaining: 
The conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in its 
relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in 
its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away.  Relatively 
to her it was not negligence at all.  Nothing in the situation 
gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency 
of peril to persons thus removed.  Negligence is not 
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652D (1977).
152. See Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy’s Disclosure Tort: An Exploration
of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, fn. 38 (1996) (citing forty-one states that 
parallel the Restatement’s elements for the public disclosure tort). 
153. § 652D, cmt. A.
154. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
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actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally 
protected interest, the violation of a right.  Proof of 
negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.155 
By way of an example: 
Suppose A engages in an activity that results in foreseeable 
harm to B. Because the harm was foreseeable, A had it within 
his power to avoid causing it; even if there were no 
precautions he could have taken to reduce the risk, he could 
have forgone the activity altogether.  He thus had a certain 
measure of control over the situation, and . . . it seems 
reasonable to ascribe to him a special responsibility for the 
outcome that, in general, other persons do not have.156
In recent history, victims of drunk drivers have been able to 
successfully file suit against the establishments that provided the 
driver with the alcohol that caused the accident.
 
157  Georgia’s dram 
shop law states: “the victims of these crashes can sue if bar staff serves 
a noticeably intoxicated person who they know will soon be 
driving.”158  What is the difference between an intoxicated person 
behind the wheel of a vehicle and a person online posting injurious 
conduct?  Focusing on the end result—nothing.  The victim of the 
drunk driver is either permanently injured or killed as a result.  The 
victim of the online injurious content is either permanently injured or 
believes there is no other option than to take their own life.159




 is that a provider of alcohol has 
the ability to observe the nature of individual consuming alcohol 
156. Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 57, 72 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 




159. See, e.g., A.O. Scott, Behind Every Harassed Child? A Whole Lot of Clueless
Adults, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, C10, available at http://movies.nytimes. 
com/2012/03/30/movies/bully-a-documentary-by-lee-hirsch.html?_r=0 (providing review of 
the movie Bully).  While the Author notes physical bullying is not the functional 
equivalent of online bullying—as a result of the missing physical contact—as online 
interactions increase, has the time come to treat an individual’s online “space” the same as 
the individual’s physical “space”? 
160. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-40 (2012).  Georgia’s Dram Shop Act takes a position
against the common law by imposing liability to providers of alcohol where injury results 
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before they are provided with another drink.  Again, this is not much 
different than a web host’s ability to review the content that is posted 
online.  As a private actor, a web host is able to review—and censor if 
necessary—speech before it is published.161  As the effects of online 
speech cannot be erased by simply removing the harmful content, 
reviewing the speech for content that has the intended effect of 
harming a third party appears to be a necessity in the fight against 
online injurious speech. 
VI. Conclusion
The Internet and social media are now integral parts of everyday 
life, and the growth of each in recent history has been nothing less 
than explosive.  Along with the increased use and accessibility comes 
the possibility of abuse and a marked increase in its harmful effects.  
Mainly, cyberbullying has become so prevalent in our society that the 
time has come to place some responsibility on the web host.  Just as 
the publisher can be held liable for publishing defamatory material,162 
the web host should be liable for doing the same because “[e]veryone 
owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that 
may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.”163 
to a third person, and the acting causing the harm was either under the age of twenty-one 
and was provided with alcohol or was provided with alcohol when in a noticeably 
intoxicated state.  See id. 
161. But see 4 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*151–52 (“[T]he liberty of the press is, indeed, essential to the nature of free state; but this
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication, and not in freedom from censure
for criminal matter when published.”).
162. E.g., Lilian Edwards, Defamation and the Internet: Name-calling in Cyberspace, in 
LAW & THE INTERNET: REGULATING CYBERSPACE 183 (Lillian Edwards & Charlotte 
Waelde eds., 1997) (asserting that “users of the Internet are more likely than ordinary 
citizens to be found publishing comments which are actionable as defamatory”).  See 
generally Gary L. Gassman, Internet Defamation: Jurisdiction in Cyberspace and the Public 
Figure Doctrine, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 563 (1996). 
163. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
